The Nature versus Nurture debate has generally been considered from the lens of genome versus experience dichotomy and has dominated our thinking about behavioral individuality and personality traits. In contrast, the role of nonheritable noise during brain development in behavioral variation is understudied. Using the Drosophila melanogaster visual system, I will discuss our efforts to dissect how individuality in circuit wiring emerges during development, and how that helps generate individual behavioral variation.

In the 17th century, physician Marcello Malpighi observed the existence of distinctive patterns of ridges and sweat glands on fingertips. This was a major breakthrough, and originated a long and continuing quest for ways to uniquely identify individuals based on fingerprints, a technique massively used until today. It is only in the past few years that technologies and methodologies have achieved high-quality measures of an individual’s brain to the extent that personality traits and behavior can be characterized. The concept of “fingerprints of the brain” is very novel and has been boosted thanks to a seminal publication by Finn et al. in 2015. They were among the firsts to show that an individual’s functional brain connectivity profile is both unique and reliable, similarly to a fingerprint, and that it is possible to identify an individual among a large group of subjects solely on the basis of her or his connectivity profile. Yet, the discovery of brain fingerprints opened up a plethora of new questions. In particular, what exactly is the information encoded in brain connectivity patterns that ultimately leads to correctly differentiating someone’s connectome from anybody else’s? In other words, what makes our brains unique? In this talk I am going to partially address these open questions while keeping a personal viewpoint on the subject. I will outline the main findings, discuss potential issues, and propose future directions in the quest for identifiability of human brain networks.

Initial social perceptions are often thought to reflect direct “read outs” of facial features. Instead, we outline a perspective whereby initial perceptions emerge from an automatic yet gradual process of negotiation between the perceptual cues inherent to a person (e.g., facial cues) and top-down social cognitive processes harbored within perceivers. This perspective argues that perceivers’ social-conceptual knowledge in particular can have a fundamental structuring role in perceptions, and thus how we think about social groups, emotions, or personality traits helps determine how we visually perceive them in other people. Integrative evidence from real-time behavioral paradigms (e.g., mouse-tracking), multivariate fMRI, and computational modeling will be discussed. Together, this work shows that the way we use facial cues to categorize other people into social groups (e.g., gender, race), perceive their emotion (e.g., anger), or infer their personality (e.g., trustworthiness) are all fundamentally shaped by prior social-conceptual knowledge and stereotypical assumptions. We find that these top-down impacts on initial perceptions are driven by the interplay of higher-order prefrontal regions involved in top-down predictions and lower-level fusiform regions involved in face processing. We argue that the perception of social categories, emotions, and traits from faces can all be conceived as resulting from an integrated system relying on domain-general cognitive properties. In this system, both visual and social cognitive processes are in a close exchange, and initial social perceptions emerge in part out of the structure of social-conceptual knowledge.

Many psychological theories assume that qualitatively different cognitive processes can result in identical responses. Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models allow researchers to disentangle latent cognitive processes based on observed response frequencies. Recently, MPT models have been extended to explicitly account for participant and item heterogeneity. These hierarchical Bayesian MPT models provide the opportunity to connect two traditionally isolated disciplines. Whereas cognitive psychology has often focused on the experimental validation of MPT model parameters on the group level, psychometrics provides the necessary concepts and tools for measuring differences in MPT parameters on the item or person level. Moreover, MPT parameters can be regressed on covariates to model latent processes as a function of personality traits or other person characteristics.